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WE SHOULD PERSUADE IRAN WITH BARGAINS NOT BOMBS 
By Theodore Adam Harris 
America is still in a cloudy haze of the aftermath of what happened on Sep-
tember 11, 2001.  The dust may have settled, but fear and itchy trigger fin-
gers are still present.  We are currently fighting the “War on Terror” both 
in Iraq and in Afghanistan. There is growing concern over Iran’s decision to 
resume uranium enrichment directly challenging the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and quite frankly, the entire global community.  
Iran’s recently elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, basically told the 
world to “get lost”, claiming that their nuclear activities are for peaceful 
purposes. He has also made very inflammatory remarks such as “Israel 
should be wiped off the face of the earth”.  Both President Bush and Vice 
President Cheney have made it clear that our country will “not allow the 
world’s most dangerous regimes to possess the world’s most dangerous 
weapons” (Daalder, 2006, p.1).  “The threat posed by weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD), with the associated risk that terrorists might get their 
hands on WMD, is emerging as the worldview…replacing the unifying 
scheme of containment which governed American and Western policy during 
the Cold War” (Russell, 2004, p.31).  The wars currently being waged in 
Iraq and Afghanistan represent a paradigm shift in American foreign policy; 
no longer are we focusing on containment, instead, pre-emptive strikes have 
become the order of the day. 
 
Introduction 
American and Iranian leaders are 
talking a great deal about each other 
when they should be spending more time 
talking to each other.  Iran’s defiance of 
the IAEA has raised questions about Te-
hran’s desire to build nuclear weapons 
and this in turn has put that country 
squarely into the cross-hairs of the 
hawks in Washington.  This case study 
reflects my search to answer a logical 
question stemming from the current 
backdrop; should we bomb Iran in order 
to prevent Tehran from obtaining nu-
clear weapons?  I am a U.S. Marine 
Corps combat veteran from the first gulf 
war where I acted as an Iranian linguist 
signals intelligence and crypto-logic 
technician.  It is impossible for me not to 
be passionate about our policies in the 
Middle East.  My interpretation of this 
research tells me that the United States 
should begin direct communications 
with Iran.  The social and behavioral sci-
ences play a huge role in determining a 
policy outcome.  Predicting how Iran 
and the rest of the world will react to our 
actions is of great importance.  Just as a 
chess player tries to look at every future 
move, so to do we need a predictable 
strategy.  This study will express the rea-
soning I have used to arrive at my claim 
that we should try to persuade Iran away 
from building nuclear weapons with bi-
lateral talks and bargains not bombs. 
We, the United States, have not had a 
diplomatic relationship with Iran since 
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the revolution in 1979.  Twenty-seven 
years of not communicating.  That is a 
long time to hold a grudge.  In essence, I 
have discovered that now is the time to 
“burry the hatchet”.     
 
Methodology and Theory 
I have limited my research to 
only certain nation states as entities of 
interest.  I have obtained an understand-
ing of the major stakeholder’s positions, 
namely, the United States, Europe and 
Iran.  It is from this understanding that I 
have formed an opinion as to what the 
best foreign policy decisions with re-
spect to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons 
should be. I have used a heuristic ap-
proach, examining both previous litera-
ture and particular case studies concern-
ing American responses to an atomic 
Iran.  I have read articles, speeches, 
books, journals, and websites on the 
topic at hand.  I have thoroughly exam-
ined and annotated each source, asking 
questions about their validity, audience, 
peer review, if they are current, objec-
tive, et cetera.        
 I have incorporated Edward 
Said’s theory concerning Orientalism 
and Jurgen Habermas’s ideas related to 
“ideal speech”, using them as an overall 
lens to help me uncover answers to this 
enormously real and important debate.  
Edward Said proposed that before there 
could be Western colonialism there must 
be this idea of a distinction between the 
“East” and the “West”.  “If the East was 
viewed as despotic and backward, and 
the West as worthy and noble, expand-
ing Western power into these regions 
could be rationalized” (Seidman, 1994, 
p. 266).  He called this phenomena “Ori-
entalism”.  I argue that there is a re-
emergence of this happening today; it 
can be found in the language.  They call 
us the “Great Satan” and in turn we have 
labeled them as part of the “Axis of 
Evil”.  It is a classic struggle between 
“Us” and “Them”.  This rhetoric demon-
strates a form of Orientalism, which 
could be used to rationalize American 
military action against Iran; after all, not 
long after Iraq was labeled as being part 
of the “Axis of Evil”, we invaded that 
country. 
While thinking about how diffi-
cult talks with Iran would be, I latched 
on to Jurgen Habermas’s ideas concern-
ing “ideal speech situations”.  Seidman 
explains this as “a social condition in 
which the parties to public discourse are 
in a situation of equality and autonomy” 
(Ibid, p.126).  My interpretation is that in 
order for real dialogue to occur, resulting 
in real exchanges of compromises, both 
parties must recognize each other’s true 
concerns, and any hint of coercion on the 
part of one side undermines the commu-
nication completely.  Using this as a 
lens, I was shocked to discover the ab-
sence of any real dialogue or “ideal 
speech” between the United Sates and 
Iran dating back to before the Islamic 
revolution in 1979.   
 
Discoveries and Discussion 
 Witnessing combat first hand has 
opened my eyes to the devastating social 
effects caused by the sheer death and 
destruction associated with modern day 
warfare.  One of the best scholarly 
sources I found that advocates a military 
strategy is Richard Russell’s article enti-
tled:  Iran in Iraq’s Shadow: dealing 
with Tehran’s nuclear weapons bid.  
This article provides a clear and decisive 
look at the exact issue I am wrestling 
with.  It is an extensive overview and 
analysis of American reactions to Iranian 
nuclear efforts.  The most alarming thing 
is that American military action is pur-
portedly not just necessary, but that it 
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should be preformed before Iran obtains 
a nuclear bomb.  After which, the re-
taliatory threat might pose to be an even 
greater risk for America.  He acknowl-
edges that diplomacy may have some 
running room left but really dismisses 
the idea in favor of derailing the Iranian 
nuclear program with force.  Russell ar-
gues: “the prospects for the transfer of 
nuclear weapons to non-state actors is 
greater in the case of Iran than it was for 
Saddam’s regime, because Tehran has 
been much more active than Baghdad 
had been in the sponsorship of terrorist 
operations, particularly those orches-
trated by Hezbollah, against the United 
States” (p.42).  This article was written 
in 2004, it is incredibly up to speed, al-
most foreshadowing current events.  The 
audience seems to be the US military as 
it was published by the US Army War 
College.  It acts as an in depth analysis 
and risk assessment. 
Mr. Russell paints a scary picture 
and if coupled with the most recent 
rhetoric out of Tehran, some could argue 
that we should start the engines on our 
B-52 Bombers immediately.  Iran’s 
president was just quoted as saying: “Is-
rael resembles a rotten tree which will be 
annihilated with the onset of one storm” 
(Olmert, 2006).  The risk of a nuclear 
bomb exploding in an American city, or 
Israel for that matter can be seen as so 
great that the idea of bombing Iranian 
nuclear facilities could easily be ration-
alized. 
The following reasoning clearly 
states why we should resort to military 
force, and deserves mentioning: “The 
difference with any action against Iran is 
stark: there is hard evidence of genuine 
WMD in preparation; hard, stated evi-
dence of intent. Also, a clearly defined, 
containable and comparatively attainable 
military objective exists; knocking out 
the enrichment site at Natanz” (Liddle, 
2006, p1).  The enrichment site at 
Natanz is being built underground with 
thousands of centrifuges.  The IAEA 
found this very alarming because it 
represents highly irregular activity if in 
fact the program is merely for peaceful 
purposes.  “Natanz seems an agreeable 
little town, perched nearly 5,000ft up in 
the majestic mountains of central Iran, 
full of dusty relics of Alexander the 
Great and black-clad peasants scurrying 
hither and thither. It is a shame, then, 
that we may soon be obliged to bomb it 
to smithereens. An even bigger shame, 
though, if we don't” (Ibid, p1).   
It was easier to find examples of 
why bombing Iran is the wrong policy 
decision.  “A United States attack on 
Iran would likely cause a spike in the 
price of oil, alienate Muslims, create a 
split within the NATO alliance, and lead 
to an increase in terrorism; it might even 
draw Iranian forces over the border to 
attack U.S. troops” (Hunter, 2006, p. 1).  
These are all unwanted results especially 
when the action itself may or may not 
completely destroy Iran’s nuclear capa-
bilities.  One report suggests “at best it 
would set back Iran’s program by a few 
years, but it would inflame public opin-
ion there and unify the nation in its de-
termination to go nuclear” (Fareed, Z., 
2006, p.31).  This opinion is echoed 
throughout most of my research find-
ings.   The idea that even if we disrupted 
Iran’s immediate capabilities, bombing 
them would only hurt us in the long run 
because it would rally patriotic fervor 
against America like never seen before.  
An example that comes to mind is the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, the average 
American proudly joined up immedi-
ately with the national war effort.  Most 
reports that I have read suggest a similar 
reaction in Iran.   
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We are faced with two undesir-
able options.  On one hand, we could 
bomb Iranian nuclear facilities because 
the threat is great.  On the other, we 
could keep up the same old saber rattling 
and feeble attempts to go through third 
parties to negotiate a settlement, in turn, 
Iran goes nuclear.  Both approaches are 
unacceptable.  I argue that there is an-
other avenue of attack.  Using my “ideal 
speech” lens, I feel that it may be possi-
ble to persuade Iran with a new and bold 
move, namely, try to listen to what they 
are truly concerned about.  Of course 
that would mean that we too would have 
to vocalize our true concerns in an open 
and “equally autonomous” forum.  That 
forum does not include the United Na-
tions, how could it if Iran does not pos-
sess nearly the same pull as America 
within its halls?  By function alone, 
America has veto power; Iran on the 
other hand does not.  I am confident that 
Habermas would suggest something dif-
ferent and not even close to third party 
negotiations.  An ideal speech situation 
can only occur with direct bi-lateral talks 
between Iran and the United States. 
Throughout my research I found 
numerous opinions that call for direct 
communication.  Looking through the 
“ideal speech” lens this situation begs 
for the next logical question:  How do 
we create such an atmosphere or “ideal 
speech situation” where both Iran and 
the United States can really negotiate a 
settlement?  Unfortunately, I have no 
answer as of yet.  I know Iran and the 
United States have extreme differences 
and it would be easy to label us as ene-
mies, but that has not stopped America 
in the past.  “Summits with the opposi-
tion are a great American tradition. 
President Richard Nixon went to Beijing 
even though China was aiding North 
Vietnam in its fight against U.S. forces.  
President Ronald Reagan proclaimed the 
Soviet Union "an evil empire" but still 
negotiated agreements with it on arms 
control and other issues.  Currently, the 
Bush administration talks directly to 
North Korea, perhaps the most danger-
ous and delusional regime in the world. 
America has never limited itself to talk-
ing only with its friends abroad.” 
(Hunter, 2006).  I disagree with Mr. 
Hunter on one point; we have limited 
ourselves, because it has been over 
twenty-seven years since we have spo-
ken directly to Iran.   
President Ahmedinejad wrote a 
letter to President Bush in May of 2006. 
This letter represents the first official 
Iranian communication with an 
American president in 27 years. He 
should take the opportunity of this 
opening and offer to engage in 
unconditional talks with Tehran aimed at 
resolving all outstanding disputes, 
including the nuclear one, with an eye to 
normalizing diplomatic relations as soon 
as possible.  As loathsome as Americans 
find Iran’s hatred of the West, we still 
need to acknowledge their concerns if 
we have any interest in persuading them 
to stop building nuclear weapons.  I fear 
that our government might just disregard 
this letter as hate mail instead of truly 
attempting to figure out what they are 
trying to say.  Edward Said might claim 
that the time for tearing down the wall 
that separates the Occident from the Ori-
ent has arrived.    
I sought to find out if Ahmedine-
jad was the right man to bargain with; 
the decision is still pending.  I found the 
following interactive chart to be educa-
tional; it acts as a superb synopsis of the 
Iranian political power structure today.  
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 Figure 2: Iran: Who Holds the Power?  BBC News [online edition] Retrieved May 17, 2006 from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/cabinet.stm 
Conclusion 
 I think that America should stop 
talking about Iran and begin a campaign 
of talking to Iran.  My military experi-
ence has shaped my values in an ironic 
way.  On one hand, I value the protec-
tion and security of America, and on the 
other, I value using the military option as 
the ultimate last resort because I am fa-
miliar with the devastating social impact 
that the resulting death and destruction 
leave behind.  My research was very 
limited in scope and detail and consisted 
solely of searching through literature on 
the subject.  I must acknowledge that it 
has only left me asking myself more 
questions.  I set out originally asking if 
we should bomb Iran to prevent that 
country from obtaining nuclear weapons.  
Using the logic and reasoning that I have 
presented, I have discovered one impor-
tant and concrete finding throughout my 
research; America should try to persuade 
Iran away from building nuclear weap-
ons with bi-lateral talks not bombs. 
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